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APPLEYARD L. The geographies of access to enterprise ﬁnance: the case of the West Midlands, UK, Regional Studies. Whilst there is
a long history of credit rationing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK, the ﬁnancial crisis has seen banks retreat
further from lending to viable SMEs due to a reassessment of risk and lack of available capital. In so doing, the credit crunch is
thought to be creating new geographies of ﬁnancial exclusion. This paper explores the ﬁnancial inclusion of enterprise through
community development ﬁnance institutions (CDFIs) which provide loan ﬁnance to ﬁrms at the commercial margins in the
West Midlands, UK. The paper concludes that CDFIs could partially address the ﬁnancial exclusion of enterprise as an additional,
alternative source of ﬁnance to that of mainstream banks.
Financial crisis Financial exclusion Community development Enterprise
APPLEYARD L.企业融资管道的地理：英国西密德兰的案例研究，区域研究。在英国，中小企业（SMEs）的信贷配给
已历史久远，但在金融危机中，银行却因对于风险的再评估以及缺乏可运用的资本，因而进一步紧缩对可行的中小
型企业的借贷。于此，信贷紧缩被认为创造了新的金融排斥性地理。本文透过提供金融借贷给英国西密德兰商业边
陲地带企业的社区发展金融机构(CDFIs)来探讨对企业的金融包容。本文结论道：CDFIs 做为主流银行之外的一个
额外、替代性金融管道，可以部分处理对企业的金融排斥性。
金融危机 金融排斥性 社区发展 企业
APPLEYARD L. Les géographies de l’accès au ﬁnancement des entreprises: étude de cas de la région des West Midlands, au
Royaume-Uni, Regional Studies. Alors que le rationnement du crédit aux petites et moyennes entreprises (Pme) est de longue
date au Royaume-Uni, le choc ﬁnancier a vu les banques abandonner davantage leurs engagements de prêt aux Pme solvables
suite à une réévaluation du risque et faute de capitaux disponibles. Par la suite, on considère que le resserrement du crédit s’accom-
pagne des nouvelles géographies de l’exclusion ﬁnancière. Cet article cherche à examiner l’inclusion ﬁnancière de l’entreprise par le
biais des institutions ﬁnancières de développement communautaire (Community Development Finance Institutions: CDFI) qui
fournissent des garanties de crédit aux entreprises aux marges commerciales dans les West Midlands, au Royaume-Uni. En
guise de conclusion, l’article afﬁrme que les CDFI, en tant qu’une autre source de ﬁnancement complémentaire à celle des
banques commerciales, pourraient faire face en partie à l’exclusion ﬁnancière de l’entreprise.
Choc ﬁnancier Exclusion ﬁnancière Développement communautaire Entreprise
APPLEYARD L. Geograﬁen der Verfügbarkeit von Unternehmensﬁnanzierung: der Fall der West Midlands in Großbritannien,
Regional Studies. Die Rationierung von Darlehen an kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen (KMU) hat in Großbritannien
lange Tradition, doch seit der Finanzkrise scheuen die Banken auch vor Darlehen an ﬁnanziell solide KMU zurück, da die
Risiken neu bewertet werden und nicht ausreichend Kapital zur Verfügung steht. Hierdurch scheint die Kreditkrise neue
Geograﬁen der ﬁnanziellen Ausgrenzung zu erzeugen. In diesem Beitrag wird die ﬁnanzielle Eingliederung von Unternehmen
mit Hilfe der Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) untersucht, die Darlehen für wirtschaftlich marginalisierte
Firmen in der britischen Region West Midlands ﬁnanzieren. Das Fazit lautet, dass CDFIs als zusätzliche bzw. alternative Finanzier-
ungsquelle zu den etablierten Banken die ﬁnanzielle Ausgrenzung von Firmen teilweise lindern könnten.
Finanzkrise Finanzielle Ausgrenzung Gemeinschaftsentwicklung Firmen
APPLEYARD L. Las geografías del acceso a la ﬁnanciación de empresas: el caso de West Midlands, RU, Regional Studies. Aunque el
racionamiento del crédito para pequeñas y medianas empresas (pymes) en el Reino Unido tiene una larga tradición, la crisis ﬁnan-
ciera ha llevado a los bancos a reducir los préstamos a las pymes sólidas debido a una revaloración de los riesgos y falta de capital
disponible. Por este motivo, parece ser que la crisis del crédito está creando nuevas geografías de exclusión económica. En este
artículo analizo la inclusión ﬁnanciera de empresas a través de las instituciones ﬁnancieras para el desarrollo de los municipios
Regional Studies, pp. 1–12, iFirst article
0034-3404 print/1360-0591 online/13/000001-12 © 2013 Regional Studies Association http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2012.748979
http://www.regionalstudies.org
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 06
:08
 17
 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
(CDFI) que ofrecen ﬁnanciación para préstamos a empresas comercialmente marginalizadas de West Midlands, Reino Unido.
Concluyo el artículo sosteniendo que las CDFI podrían solucionar parcialmente el problema de la exclusión ﬁnanciera de las
empresas como una fuente adicional y alternativa de ﬁnanciación en vez del sistema bancario clásico.
Crisis ﬁnanciera Exclusión ﬁnanciera Desarrollo de la comunidad Empresas
JEL classiﬁcations: G10, G28, G29, H81
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing literature on the ﬁnancial crisis
which began in 2007 (AALBERS, 2009a; DYMSKI,
2009; FRENCH et al., 2009; HALLSWORTH and
SKINNER, 2008; LANGLEY, 2008; LEE et al., 2009;
MARTIN, 2011; SIDAWAY, 2008; WAINWRIGHT,
2009; WOJCIK, 2009; WYLY et al., 2009). Whilst
these debates within economic geography, economics
and political economy have largely considered the
relationships between ﬁnancialization and individuals,
less attention has been paid to the important issue of
access to enterprise ﬁnance. This is surprising as ﬁrms
have experienced particular challenges in accessing
affordable mainstream ﬁnance since the start of the
credit crunch (BANK OF ENGLAND (BOE), 2010; HM
TREASURY (HMT) and DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS,
INNOVATION AND SKILLS (BIS), 2010; SMITH, 2010).
It is believed that many microenterprises and small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that were once con-
sidered viable and bankable by mainstream ﬁnancial
institutions have been excluded from accessing ﬁnance
since 2007 and continue to be excluded from accessing
affordable, mainstream ﬁnance (PIMLOTT, 2009;
SUNDERLAND, 2009, p. 1). Mainstream ﬁnancial insti-
tutions’ unwillingness to lend to individuals and
businesses due to the lack of available capital and risk
aversion is creating new and greater geographies of
ﬁnancial exclusion (FRENCH et al., 2009). In so doing,
the ﬁnancial exclusion of SMEs may have serious impli-
cations for economic recovery and future economic
growth, particularly when these ﬁrms make up a signiﬁ-
cant proportion of the UK’s private sector employment
(ECONOMIST, 2009, 2010; HMT and BIS, 2010). This
paper seeks to extend debate on the ﬁnancial crisis and
the geographies of money and ﬁnance literature by
exploring how the withdrawal of mainstream credit in
the UK has redeﬁned the concept of ﬁnancial exclusion
of enterprise, and the role that community development
ﬁnance institutions (CDFIs) (which provide access to
ﬁnance for enterprises in underserved markets) alongside
a Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) may play in
providing one solution to the increasingly signiﬁcant
ﬁnance gap.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
explores the mainstream ﬁnance gap and the signiﬁcance
of access to ﬁnance for enterprise, particularly since the
start of the 2007 credit crunch. The third section high-
lights how CDFIs aim partly to ﬁll the ﬁnance gap left
behind by mainstream ﬁnancial institutions’ withdrawal
from disadvantaged areas prior to the ﬁnancial crisis and
how since the 2007 credit crunch CDFIs are providing
additional sources of ﬁnance to ‘a new class of ﬁnancially
[…] excluded’ (FRENCH et al., 2009, p. 295). The fourth
section discusses current access to ﬁnance policies linked
to CDFIs and the potential for introducing a CRA. The
ﬁfth section outlines the context of CDFIs within the
West Midlands region of the UK, how they are provid-
ing a legitimate solution to the problems created by
market failures prior to and during the ﬁnancial crisis
for viable yet excluded enterprises, and how a CRA
could ﬁll the ﬁnance gap further. The ﬁnal section
concludes that amidst this current ﬁnancial uncertainty
there are opportunities for enterprise to overcome bar-
riers to ﬁnance via CDFIs which contribute towards a
more ﬁnancially inclusive landscape, stimulating econ-
omic growth and creating and/or preserving jobs in
the process.
THE MAINSTREAM FINANCE GAP AND
THE FINANCIAL EXCLUSION OF
ENTERPRISE
Enterprise has been highly valued by successive UK
governments (BOLTON, 1971; MACMILLAN, 1931;
RADCLIFFE, 1959; WILSON, 1979). Despite this, there
is a long history of a small ﬁrm ﬁnance gap in the UK
where banks fail to lend to viable businesses
(BOLTON, 1971; MACMILLAN, 1931; RADCLIFFE,
1959; WILSON, 1979). SMEs continue to be considered
as the lifeblood of the economy. Indeed, the current UK
coalition government believes at this time of economic
uncertainty that:
we need a[n economic] recovery led by sustained expan-
sion in the private sector, […] Small and growing
businesses are a vital part of the economic recovery.
(Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Inno-
vation and Skills, and George Osborne, Chancellor of
the Exchequer, cited in HMT and BIS, 2010, p. 3)
Despite the political rhetoric in support of SMEs, such
enterprises have often found accessing ﬁnance a challen-
ging process. This issue has become increasingly acute as
a result of the recent credit crunch.
The UK ﬁnance gap that existed prior to the 2007
ﬁnancial crisis in the supply and demand of loan
ﬁnance for commercial and social enterprises (BOE,
2 Lindsey Appleyard
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2000, 2003; MAYO et al., 1998; STOREY, 1994) has
become even deeper with many SMEs experiencing
ﬁnancial exclusion that were previously considered
viable (BOE, 2010; SMITH, 2010). UK mainstream
banks have withdrawn further from widespread
lending as they have lost the ability to lend capital due
to a reassessment of risk (WAINWRIGHT, 2009).
Whilst this ‘ﬂight to quality’ is a feature of earlier reces-
sions (LEYSHON and THRIFT, 1994, 1995), without
affordable access to ﬁnance enterprises are unlikely to
prosper, provide jobs and contribute towards economic
growth.
Financial exclusion is broadly deﬁned as lack of access
to affordable ﬁnancial products and services (DYMSKI,
2005). Financial exclusion has (until the recent credit
crunch) been particularly prevalent in disadvantaged
areas (MAYO et al., 1998), to the extent that there was
‘a systemic development of the geography of ﬁnancial
exclusion in the UK’ (BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005,
p. 286). LEYSHON (2009, p. 155) has more recently
considered the multidimensional nature of ﬁnancial
exclusion in the following ﬁve ways: ‘access exclusion’,
for example, branch closure in moderate and low-
income areas; ‘condition exclusion’, for example,
whereby customers are rejected by credit scoring
systems; ‘price exclusion’, for example, affordable
ﬁnance; ‘marketing exclusion’, for example, targeting
‘potentially proﬁtable socio-demographic groups’; and
‘self-exclusion’, for example, where customers do not
apply for ﬁnance as they: presume they will be denied,
lack product awareness or due to cultural norms such
as those who follow Sharia law (LEYSHON et al., 2004;
POLLARD and SAMERS, 2007). In the current ﬁnancial
crisis mainstream ﬁnancial institutions may be exacer-
bating access and price exclusion through the use of
condition tightening and credit scoring (BOE, 2010)
creating a more widespread geography of ﬁnancial
exclusion across the UK.
There has been a recent shift towards condition tigh-
tening by banks to exclude enterprises from accessing
ﬁnance. This is due to banks’ lack of capital which
could deteriorate further under new Basel III rules and
reduce their propensity to take risks (WEARDEN,
2010). Mainstream ﬁnancial institutions continued
failure to offer affordable credit facilities to small
businesses, particularly in deprived neighbourhoods,
represents market failure and credit rationing. This is,
in part, the result of mainstream banks assessment of
risk through the use of credit scoring which in effect
red-lines areas in which not to lend to increase the
rewards and mitigate risk in loans being defaulted
(LEYSHON and THRIFT, 1999). The use of credit
scoring has arguably exacerbated ‘access’ ﬁnancial exclu-
sion as banks had become increasingly risk averse prior
to the credit crunch (LEYSHON and THRIFT, 1999;
LEYSHON, 2009). The global ﬁnancial crisis is believed
to be intensifying such difﬁculties in accessing ﬁnance
(SEAGER, 2009; SUNDERLAND, 2009) thereby creating
‘a new class of ﬁnancially (re)excluded’ (FRENCH et al.,
2009, p. 295). For example, businesses that successfully
applied for ﬁnance in 2007 may not be able to access
that same funding now as the mainstream lenders’ assess-
ment of risk and clients that are considered viable has
changed (OFFICE OF NATIONAL STATISTICS (ONS),
2011a). Research by the UK Ofﬁce of National Stat-
istics (ONS, 2011a) shows greater demand for ﬁnance
between 2007 and 2010 (35–42% of SMEs sought
loan ﬁnance). Of those SMEs that sought loan
ﬁnance, the majority approached banks. In 2007, 90%
of loan ﬁnance applications to banks were successful.
This fell to 65% in 2010. In effect due to the increasing
numbers of businesses seeking ﬁnance, more businesses
were refused ﬁnance. Many of those that have been
refused business ﬁnance may use personal lending to
ﬁnance their business in the form of personal ﬁnance
or ﬁnancial support from family and friends (SMITH,
2010). In effect, mainstream enterprise lending, or the
lack of, has created greater inequality between those
that are bankable and those considered unbankable,
exacerbating uneven access to ﬁnance and creating
new geographies of ﬁnancial exclusion.
FILLING THE FINANCE GAP: COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
(CDFIS)
Additional ﬁnancial providers such as CDFIs have
become instrumental in providing ﬁnancial products
and services to excluded yet viable individuals and
ﬁrms (APPLEYARD, 2011; BRYSON and BUTTLE,
2005). The role of CDFIs is to ﬁll the spaces which
the mainstream ﬁnancial providers do not ﬁll. UK
CDFIs were one of the 1997 UK Labour government
ﬁnancial inclusion strategies which aimed to stimulate
and support ﬁnancially excluded enterprises in disadvan-
taged areas through providing loans and business support
as deprived areas have least access to ﬁnance (NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR NEIGHBOURHOOD RENEWAL
(NSFNR), 1999). In this way, CDFIs were considered
an additional vehicle for the supply of debt ﬁnance to
enterprise rather than simply an alternative source of
ﬁnance (FULLER and JONAS, 2003).
CDFIs were originally established partly to target and
serve the ﬁnancially excluded by providing access to
credit and, in doing so, to contribute to overcoming
ﬁnancial exclusion in which individuals and ﬁrms are
denied access to various forms of ﬁnancial products
and loans for business start-ups and ﬁrms wanting to
invest in developing their business activities (BRYSON
and BUTTLE, 2005). CDFIs work to a double bottom
line by realizing social as well as ﬁnancial objectives
and can be deﬁned as independent ﬁnance institutions
that provide capital and support to empower individuals
or organizations at the edge of commercial margins to
develop opportunity and wealth in disadvantaged areas
Geographies of Access to Enterprise Finance in the West Midlands 3
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(APPLEYARD, 2011). These institutions are involved in
higher-risk lending as they lend to viable businesses
that banks feel unable to lend to and can do so
through receiving policy guarantee funds to underwrite
the risk. Consequently, CDFIs often have to manage
relatively high default rates. They use lending criteria
developed in mainstream ﬁnancial institutions but
modify the criteria to target ﬁnancially excluded enter-
prises and to include social criteria to reach their double
bottom line (BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005). CDFIs can
offer enterprises access to affordable credit because of
their assessment of the clients through old-fashioned
relationship banking methods and enhanced due dili-
gence to determine the risk–reward ratio on an appli-
cation by application basis rather than credit scoring
(BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005). In this way:
too low a risk will exclude too many ﬁrms from the
[… CDFIs] funds while too high a risk will threaten the
[… CDFIs] long term future.
(BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005, p. 279)
In other words, CDFIs aim to be sustainable but their
double bottom line means that there may be tension
between their social and ﬁnancial objectives in actually
achieving it. Loans sanctioned by CDFIs are re-lent on
repayment which multiplies economic wealth in the
local community (BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005).
CDFIs are driven by reinvesting surplus into the
business, community or to support their mission
instead of being motivated by maximizing proﬁt for
their own beneﬁt (BOE, 2003). In this way, CDFIs
can maximize social impact by operating revolving
loan funds using public support to underwrite risk.
There is currently an unequal geography of CDFI
provision as many CDFIs have been established
ad-hoc and identiﬁed by local needs (APPLEYARD,
2011; BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005). For example,
CDFIs serve different markets such as start-up
businesses, women, ethnic minorities and particular dis-
advantaged geographical areas. Whilst this approach is
designed to reach those who are the most ﬁnancially
excluded, there may be other viable SMEs that do not
ﬁt the lending criteria set by their local CDFI which
means that they may remain ﬁnancially excluded.
With relatively high default rates and a current gap in
the provision of policy guarantee funds to the CDFI
sector, the result is that CDFIs only contribute to over-
coming ﬁnancial exclusion in some parts of the UKwith
the exception of a few national CDFIs for particular
groups, for example, young people can access loans
from The Prince’s Trust. Due to their double bottom
line, CDFIs are highly complex and so tensions within
their operations will always exist (BRYSON and
BUTTLE, 2005). They aim to be ﬁnancially viable and
consequently do not ﬁnance extremely high-risk
business propositions. This means that ﬁnancially
excluded ﬁrms which operate below the lending
threshold set by CDFIs will remain ﬁnancially excluded.
It is difﬁcult to assess the true size and scale of the ﬁnance
gap, but given the scale and depth of the crisis in the
UK, it is probable that demand exceeds supply (ONS,
2011a). With the availability of funds for CDFIs from
the UK government supported by the Phoenix Fund
(which ran from 1999 to 2006), it was assumed that as
an additional vehicle of ﬁnance CDFIs would help to
resolve the issue of ﬁnancial exclusion of enterprise
from commercial sources of ﬁnance. It is ironic then
that as with their customers, CDFIs can and are experi-
encing ﬁnancial exclusion, as information asymmetries
exist between CDFIs and mainstream ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. This makes it challenging for most CDFIs to
secure ﬁnance other than grants and charitable
donations for their operations (BRYSON and BUTTLE,
2005). In this way, CDFIs have to justify that they are
both reaching the ﬁnancially excluded and are ﬁnan-
cially viable. Yet, they cannot reach signiﬁcant
geographical scale without additional resources such as
public funding to cover risk which is increasingly difﬁ-
cult to secure.
Access to ﬁnance for enterprise is an increasingly sig-
niﬁcant issue for many UK SMEs, particularly since the
credit crunch. Whilst CDFIs originally emerged in
response to the withdrawal of mainstream ﬁnancial pro-
vision for SMEs in disadvantaged areas, more recently
they are experiencing increasing demand from ﬁnan-
cially excluded enterprises that were once considered
viable by banks in relatively afﬂuent areas. As such, the
concept of ﬁnancial exclusion is being redeﬁned and
as a result the UK CDFI sector has widened its remit
to respond to the particular problems caused by the
ﬁnancial crisis.
ACCESS TO FINANCE POLICIES
One impact of the ﬁnancial crisis has been the ﬁnancial
exclusion of enterprises that were once considered
viable by mainstream ﬁnancial institutions. The UK
coalition government is supportive of private sector
enterprise and is pressurizing banks to lend to enterprises
for them to start-up or grow (DEPARTMENT FOR
BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS (BIS), 2012;
HMT, 2011; INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
BANKING, 2011). Project Merlin was designed with
the major UK banks (Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds
Banking Group, HSBC, Santander and Barclays) to
improve both the stability and competition between
UK banks whilst increasing business lending. Yet, it is
paradoxical to increase equity in banks and lend more
to business. The impact of Project Merlin is likely to
be limited as increased lending to SMEs is only a tem-
porary feature and the lending target has already been
missed by £1 billion (BOE, 2012). The latest initiative,
Funding for Lending, is designed to incentivize banks to
lend to enterprise and to consumers for mortgages
(HMT and BANK OF ENGLAND (BOE), 2012).
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Despite numerous government and bank pledges to
provide credit to enterprise, many ﬁrms have yet to
beneﬁt from the availability of affordable bank lending
(STEWART, 2012; TYLER, 2011; WINNETT, 2011). If
the banks are not willing to lend to SMEs, CDFIs are
well placed to act as a vehicle in which banks could
lend just as in the United States under the guidance of
a Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
The CRA was introduced in the United States in
1977 to prevent racial discrimination and red-lining by
mainstream banks in the housing mortgage market
(APPLEYARD, 2011, AALBERS, 2009b; MARSHALL,
2004). However, the CRA has been blamed for the
2007 global ﬁnancial crisis as it was assumed that it
approved loans to subprime borrowers who are
deﬁned as having a poor credit history and low
income (AALBERS, 2009b). AALBERS (2009a, 2009b)
demonstrated that a more accurate deﬁnition of sub-
prime is lending at higher interest rates regardless of
income. Therefore, in fact, the CRA ‘promote[d] fair
lending to all borrowers’ rather than inappropriate
lending to those on a low income (AALBERS, 2009b,
p. 350). A UK CRA similarly needs to promote
ﬁnancial inclusion, which is why CDFIs would be an
effective vehicle for banks to support and meet the
conditions of a CRA.
Another rationale for a UK CRA is the lack of coor-
dinated and signiﬁcant public sector funding for CDFIs.
There are a number of schemes that support CDFI
activities and that CDFIs may apply for which reﬂects
the diversity of the sector, although only schemes for
enterprise are outlined here. The Enterprise Finance
Guarantee (EFG) is a loan guarantee scheme to facilitate
lending to ﬁrms with an annual turnover of up to
£41 million seeking ﬁnance of between £1000 and
£1 million and includes start-up and existing businesses,
SMEs and large ﬁrms (HMT, 2009, 2011). In addition,
the Small Loans for Businesses (SLFB) offer up to
£50000 for small businesses through CDFIs (HMGOV-
ERNMENT (HMG), 2008; HMT, 2009) and as many
CDFIs are already providing this service they are well
placed to adopt this scheme. The coalition government
has replaced the Regional Development Agency (RDA)
funding schemes with a highly competitive £1.4 billion
Regional Growth Fund (RGF) designed to support:
a fairer and more balanced economy – one that is not so
dependent on a narrow range of economic sectors, is
driven by private sector growth and has new business
opportunities that are more evenly balanced across the
country and between industries.
(HMG, 2010, p. 5)
In the ﬁrst round of bidding for the RGF, almost 450
applications were received (BIS, 2011). The UK
CDFI trade association, the Community Development
Finance Association (CDFA), was successful in its appli-
cation to create a £60 million loan fund to lend to
CDFIs in April 2011. However, by summer 2012 the
CDFA was yet to receive funding from the scheme.
The ‘Big Society Bank’ known as the Big Society
Capital Group is yet to be ﬁnalized but looks set to be
a less viable option for CDFI support in that its key
aim is to provide ﬁnance for civil society organizations
(CABINET OFFICE, 2010).
Overall, the current UK CDFI funding situation is
piecemeal and needs to be widened to include all
sectors and geographic areas (including Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland) and the conditions of
each scheme make them exclusive rather than inclusive.
The recent Breedon Report (BREEDON, 2012)
proposed that government funding initiatives be simpli-
ﬁed and welcomed more diverse non-bank forms of
debt ﬁnance though CDFIs were not mentioned
speciﬁcally. This strengthens the case for one UK
national core fund for CDFIs and potential for a UK
CRA. This would add clarity and consistency for
SMEs wishing to access ﬁnance and CDFIs as without
signiﬁcant public policy support it is unlikely that
CDFIs will become part of the longer-term ﬁnancial
landscape and a signiﬁcant minority of SMEs will
remain ﬁnancially excluded.
METHODOLOGY
The paper explores the West Midlands region of the
UK as it provides an example of how the dynamics of
ﬁnancial exclusion are changing within an area that
was relatively economically depressed prior to the ﬁnan-
cial crisis and the impact that the crisis has had on CDFI
activities. The UK’s West Midlands region comprises
the counties of theWest Midlands, Shropshire, Stafford-
shire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire and Herefordshire.
The West Midlands is suffering the effects of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis disproportionately compared with other UK
regions due to its reliance on manufacturing and
public sector employment (MARTIN, 2011) with over
9% of the population of the region unemployed com-
pared with the UK average of 7% (ONS, 2011b). The
West Midlands has an enterprise deﬁcit in relation to
other regions of the UK as the birth rate and growth
of SMEs within theWest Midlands is below the national
average (ADVANTAGE WEST MIDLANDS (AWM),
2004; DELOITTE AND TOUCHE, 2002). DELOITTE
AND TOUCHE (2002) found that the ﬁnance gap in
West Midlands was signiﬁcant and this was a key
reason for lack of SME activity in the region. By
2009, access to ﬁnance remained a key issue (Memoran-
dum from Fair Finance Consortium Ltd cited in HOUSE
OF COMMONS WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL
COMMITTEE, 2009):
Financially excluded businesses are those that the banks
don’t want to be involved with. One interpretation of
the current situation is that suddenly the bar has been
raised and that there are now many more ﬁnancially
excluded businesses. The community ﬁnance sector,
Geographies of Access to Enterprise Finance in the West Midlands 5
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arguably the one ﬁnancial services sector that knows how
to work with ﬁnancially excluded businesses still seems
excluded from being part of the solution.
(section 2.5)
The widening ﬁnance gap for SMEs, particularly in the
West Midlands, extends the rationale for the UK CDFI
sector given the strength of their knowledge of local
markets and working with viable yet ﬁnancially
excluded ﬁrms.
This paper builds on empirical research undertaken
between October 2005 and December 2009. This
involved twenty-two interviews with key actors at
UK CDFIs and within the UK CDFI sector which
were transcribed fully and analysed using NVivo. The
empirical research was also comprised of UK banks,
ﬁve UK CDFIs, the CDFA and a number of active
clients of one UK CDFI. The interview data consisted
of information of the organizations’ development, oper-
ations (including loan process) and strategy. These data
were supplemented with the UK CDFA annual
survey, UK policy reports plus regional policy docu-
ments and national press reports. Together these
methods give greater credibility and robustness to the
research. The next section will explore how CDFIs in
the West Midlands region of the UK already provide
part of the solution to the increasingly signiﬁcant
ﬁnance gap and the limitations of this without signiﬁ-
cant support.
FINANCIAL INCLUSION OF ENTERPRISE
WITHIN THE WEST MIDLANDS
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, the concept of ﬁnan-
cial exclusion is being reconﬁgured by mainstream
ﬁnancial institutions reassessment of risk. Here the
concept of ﬁnancial exclusion is explored through
CDFIs which are continually evolving to meet the shift-
ing ﬁnancially excluded enterprise markets.
The importance of West Midlands CDFIs is high-
lighted in the following statement:
[CDFIs] are important to the West Midlands both as a
sector in their own right (as part of the broader social
economy) and also in playing a key role in ensuring that
the economic growth and development of the region
beneﬁts all the population and areas. They can help to
join up the economic, environmental and the social
through their activities, provide new models for service
delivery and underpin competitiveness and employment
creation.
(NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION (NEF) and
NICHOLSON, 2003, p. 10)
From 1999 to March 2012, the West Midlands RDA,
Advantage West Midlands (AWM), had been working
with CDFIs in the whole region by identifying and
bridging the ﬁnance gaps for SMEs and by coordinating
ﬁnancial resources in the West Midlands (AWM, 2004,
p. 125). In 2005, AWM, with Barclays bank, supported
the creation of a consortium of CDFIs and other loan
providers in the West Midlands. In addition, it devel-
oped the Advantage Small Loan Programme (ASLP)
and a follow-on Small Business Loans programme
(September 2009–March 2011) which were designed
pre-credit crunch to support further provision of
region-wide access to ﬁnance for enterprise up to
£50000 by supporting enterprise CDFIs and other
loan providers to access capital and/or revenue for
their operations and was designed to act as a follow on
from the UK centralized Phoenix Fund (for more on
the Phoenix Fund, see APPLEYARD, 2011).
The support from AWM enabled CDFIs and other
loan providers located within the West Midlands to
cover the entire region. There are currently six CDFIs
and loan providers in the West Midlands operating in
a variety of markets and serving both urban and rural
populations (Table 1). In 2010, West Midlands CDFIs
lent almost £5 million to 260 microenterprises, SMEs
and social enterprises (FAIR FINANCE CONSORTIUM,
2011). The average loan approved in 2010 was
£18544, which suggests that the market gap is for
SME ﬁnance rather than micro-enterprise loans,
which tend to be for smaller sums (FAIR FINANCE
CONSORTIUM, 2011). The 2008–2010 ﬁgures show
increasing demand for loan ﬁnance fromWest Midlands
CDFIs. It has not been possible, however, to show
ﬁgures for West Midlands CDFI loans outstanding or
source West Midlands bank data. A case study of one
West Midlands based CDFI, the Aston Reinvestment
Trust (ART), will now be explored further to
Table 1. West Midlands community development ﬁnance institutions (CDFIs) and loan providers
West Midlands CDFIs Type of loana Loan size Geographic areas served
Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART) M, SE, SME £10000–50000 Birmingham and Solihull
Black Country Reinvestment Society (BCRS) M, SME £10000–50000 Black Country and Staffordshire
Coventry and Warwickshire Reinvestment
Trust (CWRT)
M, P, SE, SME £500–50000 Coventry and Warwickshire
Impetus M, SE, SME £1000–50000 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire
Midlands Community Finance (MCF) Loans P £1000–10000 Derbyshire and East Staffordshire
Black Country Enterprise Loan Fund (BCEF) M, SME £0–10000 Black Country
Note: aM, microﬁnance; P, personal ﬁnance; SE, social enterprise; SME, small and medium-sized enterprise.
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contextualize the development and potential future of
CDFIs within the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis.
ASTON REINVESTMENT TRUST (ART)
ART was established in 1997 as an independent social
ﬁnancial institution to provide ﬁnance for enterprise; it
operates in Birmingham which is the metropolitan
hub of the West Midlands. The founders of ART inﬂu-
enced a new paradigm of social ﬁnance in the UK
through the use of a revolving loan fund purely for
enterprise in disadvantaged areas. ART inspired many
others to imitate its model and it helped to persuade
the Labour government to support UK CDFIs as part
of its ﬁnancial and social inclusion agenda. CDFIs
were therefore seen as the ‘new [policy] animal’ to ﬁll
the niche left behind by mainstream ﬁnance in the
UK (Chief Executive, UK CDFI, January 2006). In
many ways ART was ahead of the rest of the CDFI
sector as it was the ﬁrst UK organization to use social
investment raised from individuals which was to be
invested locally in enterprise in Birmingham.
The core strategy of ART is:
to provide loans for viable small businesses and social
enterprises…when banks are unable to help or have
done all they can.
(ASTON REINVESTMENT TRUST (ART), 2006, p. 1)
ART’s loan fund was launched in June 1997 after a six-
year period of consultation and development. ART
operates a revolving loan fund, so as loans are sanctioned
and repaid, the funds can then be recycled and lent on to
other clients. ART provides ﬁnance for enterprise
(microenterprise, SME and social enterprise) in
Birmingham and Solihull having extended its geo-
graphic coverage over the years in line with policy
demands from public sector funders. It initially provided
loans to microenterprise and SMEs from £2000 to
£40000 and then moved on from April 2006 to
provide loans in the SME market from £10000
to £50000, targeting the whole of Birmingham and
Solihull. This strategic decision was intended to shift
ART away from deals below £10000 which had
been high risk and not cost-effective, and in response
to the changing market needs. It was originally envi-
saged that social enterprise loans would help to
balance the risk of lending to small businesses. Yet
social enterprise loans have been slow to materialize.
The loan portfolio is divided into 15% of loans to
social enterprise and 85% to loans for microenterprise
and SMEs, which comprise 50% start-up and 50% exist-
ing businesses. Prior to the recent recession, ART had a
bad debt rate of 22.6%, which was similar to the now
defunct Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLG)
default rate. This has now increased to 31% and
remains within the limits of funders, but it reduces the
ability of ART to relend loans that have been repaid
(ART, 2010). The imbalance in risk is mitigated with
the use of policy guarantee funds to underwrite the
higher risk in lending to businesses with a high social
impact. The higher default rate may reﬂect evidence
that banks are lending to SMEs with greater security
and track record and many SMEs are struggling to
survive in the current economic conditions (ONS,
2011a).
As ART was founded prior to the Phoenix Fund,
funding for ART’s initial capital was obtained through
social investment (with a social return) from corporate,
public and private investors. This investment was then
used to leverage additional funds from banks, charitable
foundations and trusts so that ART could build its port-
folio and be independent of public funds. ART,
however, also targeted policy guarantee funds to under-
write risk and made careful use of these at an early stage
from the public sector. In this way, it aimed to move
towards operational sustainability from the outset
whilst recognizing the need for scale in its operations,
policy guarantee funds for depth of reach in targeting
underserved markets and in more challenging economic
conditions such as at present:
right at the outset before a lot of other CDFIs got going,
[we were] grounded in the principle of trying to move
towards sustainability and the only way you could move
towards sustainability was by lessening your requirement
over time from the public sector.
(Steve Walker, Chief Executive, ART, January 2006)
ART, after expansion, has now reached a level of 90%
operational sustainability. Funds obtained from the
UK government’s Phoenix Fund allowed ART (and
other UK CDFIs) to fulﬁl their role within the sector
and provide the market with alternative ﬁnance by
increasing scale and reach, and enabled them to take
on additional risk in their lending activity. By taking
additional risk, ART has fulﬁlled its role in lending to
underserved markets while remaining true to its
mission of supporting local jobs for local people.
DEMAND FOR ENTERPRISE FINANCE
DURING THE CREDIT CRUNCH
Since June 1997, ART has lent almost £10 million to
over 530 businesses and created and/or preserved over
4200 jobs (ART, 2011). In 2010–2011 ﬁnancial year,
55% of ART loans were to businesses under three
years old, and 25% of loans were made to black and
minority ethnic businesses (ART, 2011). Since the
start of the credit crunch ART has seen increased
demand for its services. Steve Walker, ART’s Chief
Executive, stated that:
There is very little proﬁt in small business loans for the
banks, so they tend to be cautious about offering them.
The credit crunch has only accelerated a trend which
started 20 years ago. A bank may consider a business
Geographies of Access to Enterprise Finance in the West Midlands 7
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‘risky’ because it has no trading history, or the owners want
to change direction, or because the owner has insufﬁcient
assets to guarantee a loan.
(BIRMINGHAM POST, 2011, p. 18)
Therefore:
The vital question for the UK economy […] is if the banks
aren’t lending to small or even medium sized businesses
and CDFIs lack the resources to step in, as our experience
shows, who is going to ﬁll the gap?.
(Steve Walker, Chief Executive, ART, December 2009)
The increase in demand for West Midlands CDFI loans
is generally reﬂected across the UK CDFI sector (COM-
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCE ASSOCIATION
(CDFA), 2012a, 2012b). The CDFA (2012b) reported
that the UK CDFI sector made £23 million worth of
loans to over 1500 enterprises during the 2011–2012
ﬁnancial year. This is a marked increase on previous
years even with the reduction in CDFI members.
CDFA (2009) stated that since 2007 banks are unable
to meet the increased demand for ﬁnance and as a result:
many CDFIs are coping with a substantial increase in
enquiries and loan applications by customers who would
have been served by banks when the economy was
healthier.
(p. 4)
Many SMEs remain unaware of CDFI ﬁnance, which
points to the need for a more cohesive movement
(CDFA, 2012a; WHEATLEY, 2012):
I believe there is probably a lot more demand out there
that ART could do but people don’t know that ART
exists […].
(Director, ART, January 2006)
Increasing demand for ﬁnance may reﬂect the maturity
of the sector as it becomes established (BIS et al., 2010),
but is more likely to reﬂect the current ﬁnancial climate
and inability of SMEs to access ﬁnance from banks.
It appears that the credit crunch is seeing CDFIs serve
customers that were once considered bankable when
the economy was growing as more CDFIs are seeing
greater numbers of viable enterprises and are able to
secure their loans. Moreover, this increase may reﬂect
the need for additional alternative sources of ﬁnance
beyond conventional locations of geographic and
social disadvantage:
to counter what are seen to be the regressive social effects
of the cost of these market-based ﬁnancial services […] to
create a responsible, inclusive and diverse ﬁnancial
economy.
(LEYSHON et al., 2004, p. 638)
The majority of the UK’s CDFIs were set up to encou-
rage renewal in under-invested communities. Now, as
the economic landscape is changing, CDFIs may no
longer be seen as the lenders of last resort, but
dynamic organizations which could provide a partial
solution to an increasingly signiﬁcant ﬁnance gap, if
only they receive the appropriate investment.
This section has explored howWest Midlands CDFIs
and UK CDFIs are and could ﬁll the widening ﬁnance
gap further. The current credit crunch has shown how
vital access to debt ﬁnance (particularly up to £50000)
is for SMEs at this time. UKCDFIs remain in a transition
period in terms of strategy and funding. There is as yet no
ﬁnal decision regarding the way in which CDFIs will be
funded in the longer term, if at all, despite the recognition
that to achieve social outcomes, public or private subsidy
is essential to underwrite risk as CDFIs are not sustainable
without it (BIS et al., 2010). The UK coalition govern-
ment has stated that:
backing enterprise by providing ﬁnance to those who
struggle to get credit from mainstream lenders meets a
vital need […] we are committed to helping the commu-
nity ﬁnance sector ﬂourish and grow.
(PRISK, 2010)
However, there is often a disconnection between rheto-
ric and actions as has been seen historically with the per-
sistent ﬁnance gap for SMEs and the ﬂurry of recent
government initiatives that have so far failed to make a
signiﬁcant impact.
TIME FOR A UK COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA)?
The introduction of a UK CRA and disclosure of
banking activity would be a controversial move but
perhaps a necessary one given the impact of the 2007
ﬁnancial crisis and scale of exclusion in the UK
(LEYSHON and THRIFT, 1995, p. 330; FRENCH et al.,
2009; TYLER, 2011). The CRA cannot be viewed as ‘a
panacea for ﬁnancial exclusion’ due to the complex
nature of ﬁnancial exclusion in the UK (MARSHALL,
2004, p. 242).Yetwithout collaboration and cooperation
from other ﬁnancial institutions, under the regulation
of a UK CRA it is unlikely that CDFIs will ‘ever consti-
tute a comprehensive and systematic tool for combating
[ﬁnancial] exclusion’ (BRYSON and BUTTLE, 2005,
p. 286). This is despite CDFIs showing that they have
the potential to be an appropriate model for underserved
markets.
A UK CRA would, ﬁrst, force all banks to lend to
SMEs as banks would refer those that were denied
access to ﬁnance to CDFIs (who would then be respon-
sible for the loan process in return for funding) as a UK
CRA would divert bank funding which it would have
lent to SMEs to CDFIs which would make extra
resources available for CDFIs to cope with the
additional geographical coverage, markets and risk
beyond disadvantaged areas as the nature of ﬁnancial
exclusion changes. Second, a CRA would make banks
lending more transparent and accountable for their
activities.
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Despite UK CDFIs actively responding to meet the
(geographically uneven but largely) increased demand
for ﬁnance in the current ﬁnancial crisis, CDFIs have
yet to receive ‘coordinated government support’
beyond the Phoenix Fund (AINSWORTH, 2009;
CDFA, 2009, 2010, 2012b; NEF, 2009, p. 3). Current
CDFI activities are restrained, which means that they
have a relatively limited impact both in terms of ﬁnan-
cial inclusion and on the wider ﬁnancial system. Many
SMEs continue to be unaware of CDFI ﬁnance which
points to the need for a more cohesive movement
(CDFA, 2012a; WHEATLEY, 2012):
It’s not always the easiest sector to understand and […] it’s
hard […] to get clear messages or policies because they are
trying to address too many things.
(RDA Consultant, June 2006)
I think they need to work an awful lot harder about raising
awareness and I think the CDFA need to be able to help
but one of the limiting factors, of course, is there isn’t a
single brand, you know you have got these different
CDFIs in the UK, they have all got different names
haven’t they? So it doesn’t help at all.
(Director, CDFI, June 2006)
A CRA would follow suggestions made by the Breedon
Report (BREEDON, 2012) that access to ﬁnance needs
to be simpliﬁed as SMEs are often unaware or confused
by the array of policy initiatives available.
The key issue here is if the banks are not lending,
then CDFIs are willing to take on the risks the banks
are not, but only with sufﬁcient policy cover to cover
the risk of default. A CRA would drive banks to
support CDFI activities to lend to viable business prop-
ositions that could preserve and/or create jobs. CDFIs
could provide a partial, legitimate solution to the ﬁnan-
cial exclusion of enterprise, though not without
additional resources, greater geographical coverage and
bank engagement.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the impact of the 2007 ﬁnancial
crisis on access to ﬁnance for enterprise in the UK.
Whilst there is a literature surrounding the ﬁnancial
crisis on personal ﬁnance, access to enterprise ﬁnance
has received less attention. In response, this paper
explored how the credit crunch has exacerbated
banks’ unwillingness to lend to viable commercial and
social enterprises thereby intensifying ﬁnancial exclusion
of enterprise in the UK and redeﬁning the concept of
ﬁnancial exclusion in the process. In so doing, it has
explored how an additional ﬁnancial sector in the
form of CDFIs, which largely emerged in the 1990s to
ﬁll the ﬁnance gap created by bank withdrawal, have
been well placed to serve a growing ﬁnancially excluded
market in the current ﬁnancial crisis. One of the impor-
tant ﬁndings of this paper has been that CDFIs are
hybrid ﬁnancial institutions due to their double
bottom line and that a dichotomy between mainstream
and alternative ﬁnance does not exist.
The paper has shown that the current economic crisis
continues to form new geographies of ﬁnancial exclu-
sion, yet CDFIs have the potential to provide a partial
solution to the increasingly signiﬁcant ﬁnance gap. To
do this, coordinated and appropriate support for
additional alternative ﬁnancial providers is essential in
order to create a ﬁnancially inclusive landscape. A core
national fund to increase scale and geographical cover-
age of CDFIs is essential to create greater clarity in
their mission, underwrite risk and increase awareness
of additional sources of ﬁnance. While a UK CRA
could increase the scale and impact of CDFIs, it could
also make more SMEs ﬁnancially included. Therefore,
with greater cooperation between banks and CDFIs,
greater even coverage across UK could be reached to
add both social and economic value to the economy.
Yet there is a divergence between political rhetoric,
the solutions to bridge the ﬁnance gap and the scale of
the issue.
The ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted the extent and
depth of the SME ﬁnance gap which existed prior to
the crisis (DELOITTE AND TOUCHE, 2002) and since
2007 has continued to grow (BOE, 2012). Given that
the UK coalition government is highly supportive of
the private sector to provide employment, it may
prove fruitful for them also to support additional ﬁnan-
cial providers for enterprise as a way of creating jobs and
a cost-effective alternative to welfare payments. As this
paper has demonstrated, UK CDFIs are providing a
viable solution for ﬁnancially excluded enterprises and
could play a more signiﬁcant role in contributing to
future economic growth, but only with appropriate
policy support. Moreover, further research and debate
surrounding access to enterprise ﬁnance is an important
narrative that needs to be explored further.
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